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The following students have been elected to the Order of the
Coif: William J. Adams, Jr., J. M. Little, Jr., and Frank Parker
Spruill, Jr.
The Winston-Salem Foundation Award, an honorary loan fund
established in 1932, was awarded for next year to Hugh L. Lobdell.
The Henry Strong Educational Foundation Award, an honorary
loan fund just established, has been awarded to Emmett C. Willis,
Jr. as the first recipient.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Banks and Banking-Insolvency as Bar to Defense of
Fraud in Action on Statutory Liability.
In an action by the Commissioner of Banks to recover a statutory
assessment, defendant stockholder set up, as defense and ground for
rescission of his subscription, the fraud of the bank's president in-
ducing the purchase. Two and a half years elapsed between defend-
ant's subscription and the insolvency of the bank, during which time
dividends amounting to twelve per cent a year were received and
retained by defendant and his name appeared as stockholder on the
books of the -bank. Held: Defense and counterclaim allowed, for
otherwise the defrauding bank president would benefit, as depositor,
creditor, and subscriber, by his own fraud.'
Authorities differ as to whether insolvency of a bank will prevent
one of its stockholders from showing, as against the receiver, that
fraudulent misrepresentations by the bank's agents 2 induced his pur-
chase. What are probably the better reasoned decisions, viewing the
double liability as imposed solely for the benefit of creditors3 and
hence not subject to be prejudiced by acts of the bank of which
creditors had no knowledge, deny 4 to a shareholder the right of plead-
ing such fraud, after failure of the bank, either as defense 5 to the
'Hood v. Martin, 203 N. C. 620, 166 S. E. 793 (1932).
2 Promoters come within this classification. Stone v. Walker, 201 Ala.
130, 77 So. 554 (1917) ; Green v. Stone, 205 Ala. 381, 87 So. 862 (1921). But
see note (1910) 24 HARV. L. Rav. 147.
' Equities of other stockholders may influence the result. Meholin v. Carl-
son, 17 Idaho 742, 107 Pac. 755 (1910).
4 Some courts consider the stockholder "estopped" as against creditors.
Blackert v. Lankford, 740 Okla. 61, 176 Pac. 532 (1918); Farmers' State
Bank v. Empey, 35 S. D. 107, 150 N. W. 936 (1915) ; see Baird v. Anderson,
60 N. D. 444, 235 N. W. 150, 152 (1931). But see Wehby v. Spurway, 30
Ariz. 274, 246 Pac. 759, 762 (1926) (holding estoppel unnecessary).
'Although the stockholder may seek redress against the defrauding party
in a separate suit, in the receiver's action he cannot set-off or counterclaim
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receiver's action to recover a statutory assessment 6 or as a ground
for rescission of the subscription 7 or stock purchase.8 It makes no
difference that the fraud was not discovered 9 or could not, by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, have been uncovered' ° prior to the
for the fraud against his double liability. Lantry v. Wallace, 182 U. S. 536,
21 Sup. Ct. 878, 45 L. ed. 1218 (1901) ; Taylor v. American Nat. Bank, 2 F.
(2d) 479 (1924) ; Dyar v. Mobley, 170 Ga. 65, 152 S. E. 74 (1930); Smith v.
Groesbeck, 54 S. D. 350, 223 N. W. 308 (1929) ; Note (1932) 41 YALE L, J.
583.
'Anderson v. Cronkleton, 32 F. (2d) 170 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) ; Litchfield
Bank v. Church, 29 Conn. 137 (1860) ("Stockholders, who hold themselves out
as constituting the bank, should bear the loss") ; Meholin v. Carlson, supra note
3; Com. of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 253 Mass. 205, 148 N. E. 609
(1925) ; State Bank v. Gotschall, 121 Ore. 92, 254 Pac. 800 (1927) ; Smith v.
Bradshaw, 54 S. D. 158, 222 N. W. 683 (1928) ("Deceit by officers of the
bank or the government is no defense, but defendant must look to them for
redress") ; Duke v. Johnson, 123 Wash. 43, 211 Pac. 710 (1923); 7 C. J.
§101; see Lantry v. Wallace, 182 U. S. at 549, 21 Sup. Ct. at 883, 45 L. ed. at
1225; Rathbun v. Goldman, 164 Minn. 507, 205 N. W. 436, 437 (1925).
"A stockholder's liability upon a stock assessment is a matter between
him and creditors of the banks, . . . and his responsibility therefor must
be determined by the fact of his ownership and what he permitted ov caused
the bank's records to show concerning it, and not by what was said and done
by the bank's officers to induce him to become such." Wehby v. Spurway,
supra note 4, 246 Pac. at 761. See also Witisett v. Spurway, 30 Ariz. 287,
246 Pac. 763 (1926).
"Ryan v. Mt. Vernon Nat. Bank, 224 Fed. 429 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) ; Salter
v. Williams, 219 Fed. 1017 (D. N. J. 1914) ; Note (1932) 41 YAxs L. J. 583;
CLARI, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) §164.
"It is contrary to legislative policy for protection of depositors . . . that
stockholders, who appear to be such on the books of the trust company at the
time it goes into ... liquidation, may repudiate liability to creditors because they
have .been defrauded. . . . [A stockholder] is in a better position to protect
himself than the depositors and other creditors who could only rely on . . .
the stockholders' liability". Bittenbender v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 253
Mass. 230, 148 N. E. 619, 620 (1925).
A counterclaim seeking rescission after insolvency of the bank is usually
set up primarily to avoid the statutory liability. It differs from a mere de-
fense on the same ground in that return of the purchase price is sought.
It is well settled in England that after insolvency fraud cannot be pleaded
to avoid liablity. Oakes v. Turquand, L. R. 2 H. L. 325 (1867); CLARK,
CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) §163.
' The rule denying the right to rescind after the bank's insolvency applies
only to subscriptions, not to purchases of stock. Merrill v. Florida Land Co.,
60 Fed. 17 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893) ; Litchfield Bank v. Peck, 29 Conn. 384 (1860) ;
Note (1931) 65 U. S. L. REV. 291. Contra: Brooks v. Austin, 206 S. W. 723
(Tex. Civ. App. 1918) ("The argument that other stockholders should not
profit by the fraud of their officers does not apply when the fraud is by an
outsider"). No distinction is recognized in Farmers' State Bank v. Empey,
supra note 4. Since the capital of the bank is in no way impaired by rescission
of a stock transfer between two individuals, the majority rule appears to be
preferable.9Meholin v. Carlson, supra note 3; Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 583.
" Scott v. Latimer, 89 Fed. 843 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898). Contra: Smith v.
Jones, 173 Ky. 776, 191 S. W. 500 (1917).
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insolvency. Nor will the case be altered by the fact that rescission
-has been obtained, either informally"' or by judgment.' 2
A second line of cases, however, adhering to what is termed the
American rule, and acting on the theory that the bank's fraud vitiates
the contract at the purchaser's option,'3 holds that insolvency alone
will not prevent rescission. 14 This result is frequently reached when
the court considers that insolvency followed the purchase so closely
.as not to allow time for investigating the affairs of the bank. 15 In
the leading case announcing this doctrine there was the additional
significant finding that the creditors had waived their claims against
-the subscribers. 18
A close analysis of the seemingly opposite views leads to the can-
-clusion that, in practical effect, there exists little or no difference
between the two. Both agree in general that the fraudulent con-
tract is voidable only,'1 and that it cannot be revoked where the de-
frauded party is chargeable with lack of diligence in discovering the
fraud, with laches in asserting his claim,' 8 or with acts giving rise to
" Farmers' State Bank v. Empey, supra note 4.
"Blackert v. Lankford, supra note 4 (shareholder's name remained on the
'books) ; see Bundy v. Wilson, 66 Colo. 253, 180 Pac. 740, 741 (1919).
Even a rescission prior to the insolvency may be avoided as being an illegal
transfer within the time limit, before bankruptcy. Wehby v. Spurway, supra
note 4; Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 583.
"The general rule-that a repudiated contract is void ab initio-is not
applied so as to prejudice rights of creditors. Wehby v. Spurway, supra note
4. But see Chapman v. Penix, 274 S. W. 187, 189 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
"Newton Bank v. Newbegin, 74 Fed. 135 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896) ; People v.
Cal. Safe Deposit Co., 19 Cal. App. 414, 126 Pac. 516 (1912) ; Gress v. Knight,
135 Ga. 60, 68 S. E. 834 (1910) ; Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 674; (1919) 5 IowA
L. BULL. 59; (1910) 24 HARV. L. REv. 147; BALLANTINE, CORPOaRAToNs (1927)
149.
After rescission, the stockholder becomes a creditor of the bank, subject
-to paramount claims of depositors and other creditors who dealt with the bank
in good faith relying upon his subscription. Green v. Stone, supra note 2.
1 Stone v. Walker, supra note 2 (stock held six months, between the pur-
chase and the insolvency); Rathbun v. Goldman, supra note 6 (stock held
nine months); Morrisey v. Williams, 74 W. Va. 636, 82 S. E. 509 (1914)
(stock held one month).
1" Newton Nat. Bank v. Newbegin, supra note 14. In that case a stock-
'holder of six months standing brought suit for rescission while the bank was
operating as a solvent, going concern, under a reorganization plan; creditors
had agreed to compromise their claims, accepting in satisfaction obligations
-of the reorganized bank. The court found that creditors had thereby waived
their claims-against stockholders.
I Stufflebeam v. De Lashmutt, 101 Fed. 367 (C. C. D. Ore. 1900) ; Com. of
Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., supra note 6.
"Williams v. Stone, 25 F. (2d) 831 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928) ; Meholin v. Carl-
son, supra note 3; Reid %v. Owensboro Savings Bank, 141 Ky. 444, 132 S. W.
1026 (1911); Foster v. Broas, 120 Mich. 1, 79 N. W. 969 (1899). See Smith
-v. Groesbeck, supra note 5.
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an estoppel,19 or where rights of innocent third parties have inter-
vened.20 It is in regard to the pleading and proof essential to this
last factor that the dispute arises. Unless the statute clearly provides,
as does the one in North Carolina,2 1 that stockholders are liable for
all debts, 22 the outcome of a particular case is likely to depend upon
the presence or absence of intervening, good faith creditors. 28 Only
in one or two instances have rights of subsequent claimants been
affirmatively denied.24
The burden of showing absence of such creditors should fall upon
the stockholder, since the ordinary presumption is that debts are
constantly being created by a solvent bank ;2& but some courts. con-
sidering the information peculiarly within the knowledge of the bank,
" Scott v. Deweese, 181 U. S. 202, 21 Sup. Ct. 585, 45 L. ed. 822 (1901) ;
Ryan v. Mt. Vernon Nat. Bank, supra note 7; Alsop v. Conway, 188 Fed. 568
(C. C. A. 6th, 1911); Scott v. Latimer, supra note 10; Little v. Owensboro
Savings Bank, 150 Ky. 331, 150 S. W. 334 (1912) ; Reid v. Owensboro Savings
Bank, supra note 18; Corn. of Banks v. Carrier, 202 N. C. 850, 165 S. E. 678(1932).
0°MoRsE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) §671 A; note (1919) 5
IowA L. BumL 59.
"Stockholders of every bank ... shall be individually responsible ... for
all contracts, debts, and engagements of such corporation... ." N. C. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1931) §219 (a).
' Anderson v. Cronkleton, supra note 6; Lantry v. Wallace, 97 Fed. 865
(C. C. A. 8th, 1899) ; Foster v. Broas, supra note 18; see Bundy v. Wilson,
supra note 12, 180 Pac. at 742.
Com. of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., supra note 6; Farmers' State
Bank v. Empey, supra note 4; Chapman v. Harris, 275 S. W. 75 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925); Davis v. Burns, 173 S. W. 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Burleson
v. Davis, 141 S. W. 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Morrisey v. Williams, supra
note 15 (stating that transferor of stock remains liable foir debts that accrued
while he held the stock) ; (1919) 5 IowA L. BULL. 59; (1910) 24 HARV. L.
REv. 147; see Taylor v. Am. Nat. Bank, supra note 5, at 482; Gress v. Knight,
supra note 14 (stating that prior creditors might defeat rescission by showing
laches, estoppel, or that the shareholder allowed increaw-of indebtedness and
lessening of assets); FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (1917) §636. But see (1908)
22 HARv. L. REv. 58.
"Litchfield Bank v. Peck, supra note 8; Marion Trust Co. v. Blish, 170
Ind. 686, 84 N. E. 814 (1908) (holding that receiver can assert only rights
common to all creditors). ,
"If creditors' rights in the capital were no greater than defendant's before
appointment of a receiver, they surely are no greater after. Rights of both
are fixed by law, not by change from solvency to insolvency of the bank".
Salter v. Williams, 244 Fed. 126 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1917), reaching the'curious and
somewhat illogical result of allowing rescission after the shareholder had paid
his assessment and disclaimed intention to sue for its recovery.
'4 Smith v. Bradshaw, supra note 6; Farmers' State Bank v. Empey, supra
note 4; Chapman v. Harris, supra note 23. See Anderson v. Cronkleton, supra
note 6, at 172; Lantry v. Wallace supra note 22, at 867; Stufflebeam v. De
Lashmutt, supra note 17, at 371; Newton Nat. Bank v. Newbegin, supra note
14, at 140 (stating that lapse of a considerable time between subscription and
insolvency will obviate the necessity of showing debts incurred).
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require proof by the receiver of intervening liabilities.28 Most courts
do not, however, require a showing that such were incurred in re-
liance upon the subscription in issue.27 Probably the best practical
result is reached by the few courts which neatly avoid the whole
difficulty by considering rights of creditors as intervening at the
time of the bank's insolvency.28 Indeed, the courts might well cease
to talk of intervening equities; the proneness to presume either ab-
sence or presence of creditors and reliance on the subscription makes
such requirement largely superfluous.
The conclusion seems to be that, while insolvency alone may not
bar a plea of fraud,29 yet when taken in connection with other factors
which are inevitably present, it will serve to exclude such evidence.
In other words, although it is material only on the question of inter-
vention of creditors' rights, the practical certainty of a finding of such
claims renders academic the possibility 6f superior equity on the part
of the shareholder.
I Smith v. Jones, 173 Ky. 776, 191 S. W. 500 (1917) (stock held seven
months) ; see Stone v. Walker, supra note 2, at 561; Gress v. Knight, supra
note 14.
"It is not to be inferred that creditors parted with anything on the faith
of plaintiff's money fraudulently held by the bank; to allow the receiver
to retain the proceeds of the fraudulent sale would be to give creditors the
fruits of a gross fraud, which would make them particeps criminir". Merrill
v. Fla. Land Co., supra note 8, stock held six months).
The amount of new indebtedness that must be shown varies. Excess over
the value of stock subscribed, though not necessarily a "large proportion",
was held sufficient in Wilkes v. Knight, 142 Ga. 458, 83 S. E. 89 (1914) ; any
creditors becoming such in reliance upon the shareholder's apparent ownership
sufficed in Farmers' State Bank v. Empey, supra note 4; "considerable" sub-
sequent liability was required in Newton Nat. Bank v. Newbegin, supra note
14, and Morrisey v. Williams, supra note 15; see BALLANTINE, COROATIONS
(1927) 149; and "substantial" intervening debts were enough in Gress v. Knight,
supra note 14.
" Reid v. Owensboro Savings Bank, supra note 18; Bittenbender v. Cos-
mopolitan Trust Co., supra note 7 ("Creditors have presumably relied in part
upon the stability of stockholders' liability"); Davis v. Burns, -upra note 23;
Burleson v. Davis, supra note 23 ("By subscribing, defendants induced de-
positors and creditors to become such, relying on.the subscriptions") ; see Lan-
try v. Wallace, supra note 22, at 867 ("One reason defendant was solicited to
become a stockholder was that his influence would attract patronage to the
bank. And it is probably true that some persons became creditors because of
defendant's connection with the bank"); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1927)
149. Contra: Stufflebeam v. De Lashniutt, supra note 17 (stock held one
month) ("Where there is no room for inference that credit was given on the
faith of defendant's ownership of stock, he should be allowed to rescind whether
there are intervening creditors or not") ; see People v. Cal. Safe Deposit Co.,
supra note 14, at 519.
' Scott v. Deweese, supra note 19; Salter v. Williams, supra note 24; Com.
of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., supra note 6.
'As pointed out in Note (1927) 51 A. L. R. 1203, it is difficult to de-
termine how far insolvency controls a decision that fraud is barred as a de-
fense, since such actions are only brought after insolvency.
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It is readily apparent that the instant case is considerably out of
line with the authority as outlined above. The fact set-up seems to
furnish adequate basis, in connection with the bank's insolvency, for
protecting the equities of depositors, creditors, and other stockholders.
The distinction pointed out by the court between the instant case
and Corporation Commissioner v. McLean"o would, in accordance
with authority,81 further impeach the result of the instant case. The
court's reliance on the fact that the defrauding bank president would
profit -by his own fraud-described by the court as "the egg that
spoils the omelet"--is, from the standpoint of innocent creditors,
as unsatisfactory as it is unique. The court sems to have disregarded
entirely the plain wording, as well as the evident intent of the North
Carolina "double liability" statute.3 2
JAMES M. LITTLE, JR.
Banks and Banking-Power of Banks to Pledge Assets to
Secure Depositors.
Plaintiff railroad had deposited its funds in defendant national
bank on condition that the bank should furnish corporate surety
bonds, which it did. While the bank was still solvent, it induced the
railroad to accept a substitution of Liberty bonds owned by the bank
for the surety bonds which secured the deposit. The bank failed,
and this action is against the receiver who has failed to surrender the
Liberty bonds. Held: The action cannot be maintained; the agree-
ment by which the bank pledged some of its assets to secure private
funds was beyond the power of the bank, and unenforceable.'
- 202 N. C. 77, 161 S. E. 854 (1932). The tenor of this case is distinctly
in accord with the stricter view: "It is only when it is shown that a person
whose name appears on the books of the corporation as a stockholder, is not
in fact an owner of stock, that such person is not subject to the statutory
liability. . . The only issues of fact which may be raised by such appeal
and determined in the Superior Court, ordinarily, are: (1) Was the appellant
a stockholder of the insolvent banking corporation at the date of his assess-
ment? (2) If so, how many shares of the capital stock of said corporation did
appellant own at said date? . . . Having received all the benefits arising
from the ownership from stock ... it is not unjust that they should now bear
their share of the burden imposed by law upon them by reason of their owner-
ship of said stock."
' See note 8 supra.
2 Supra note 21. The case is perhaps supportable by North Carolina au-
thority dealing with corporations other than banks. Chamberlain v. Trogden,
148 N. C. 140, 61 S. E. 628 (1908).
A recent enactment, P. L. 1933, ch. 159, provides for a surplus fund in
lieu of the additional liability imposed upon bank stockholders. The statute
is mandatory as to banks organized after its ratification, and those then in
operation are given the option of coming within its provisions.
'Texas & P. R. Co. v. Pottorff, 63 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
